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Introduction
(n a book entitled “Estate Planning” by R. J. Trevelyan of 
the Canada Life Assurance Company Estate Planning Division, 
the author points out that on the death of a man a number of 
financial problems arise. He then draws this very “objective” 
conclusion:
“It soon became apparent that life insurance, in addition to 
serving its primary function, could also be used to protect and 
conserve the other assets o f  the estate. Thus it was that ‘estate 
planning’ began.”
With deference to the claim made by the life insurance industry, 
the writer suggests it is somewhat misleading. The fact is “estate 
planning” has gone on for centuries.
Estate planning is a fascinating subject. It is today and has 
been for centuries the function of lawyers. The estate tail and the 
long legal struggle waged over freedom of alienation erf property 
were direct products of estate planning. Today, accountants, trust 
officers and life underwriters are all involved in estate planning. 
They can and do provide useful functions, but they must be 
watched. Estate planning is fascinating because it touches so many 
branches of law and for this reason it is far too complicated to 
allow an accountant, trust officer or life underwriter a free hand, 
though each of these persons may be quite well vei:ed in some 
aspects of trust, corporate, tax and insurance law. Estate plan­
ning is not tax planning though planning for taxes is involved; 
estate planning is not the sale of life insurance though lite insur­
ance may be sold as part of a plan.
In the view of the writer estate planning is simply the con­
struction of an arrangement to facilitate the preservation of a 
man’s wealth and the orderly devolution of that wealth on his 
demise.
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In this paper it is proposed to discuss briefly a number of 
points which may be considered in lifetime estate planning. They 
are by no means exhaustive nor will there be undertaken any fine 
legal analysis of problems. The intention is purely and simply to 
raise some points which may be of interest from day to day. Most 
of what will be said will be tax orientated.
2. Constructing A Plan: The First Step
A child’s first step is the most important because it is from 
there that he builds and progresses into a sturdy walk. The same 
is true of estate planning. The first step is to GATHER YOUR 
INFORMATION. You must go into the most intimate comers 
of your client’s affairs. For example, you should check to see how 
he and his wife get along. A previous marriage and divorce is a 
caution sign. All documents and the facts upon which they were 
obtained should be reviewed. (There is one case now going on in 
the Quebec Courts in which the validity of a New Brunswick 
divorce is being contested on the grounds that the petitioner was 
not domiciled in New Brunswick ) Are all the children legitimate; 
are any children handicapped ?o that special provision might be 
made for them. What is the nature and extent of a client’s assets? 
What is his income? Has he made any lifetime gifts? If so have 
these been documented. Are there any persons other than immedi­
ate family he wishes to benefit. What are his liabilities? Has he 
made pledges that he wants honored. If the pledge is not binding 
on the estate it is doubtful that an executor could honor it in the 
absence of a specific authorization in the will. This is only the 
beginning of your job but it is vital to complete it before venturing 
on any estate plans. Let us now consider some problems which 
arise and some methods of dealing with them.
3. Estate Tax and Liquidity
Possibly the first problem which will emerge is the estate tax, 
probate fees and other expenses which will arise immediately on 
death. This is a problem of liquidity and if there are not sufficient 
liquid assets in the estate to meet these expenses, you must build 
such assets.
One method to obtain liquidity is life insurance. Under the 
Estate Tax Act, insurance is now taxed to the person who owns it 
and ownership includes such things as the right to assign the 
policy, to borrow on it, to change or designate the beneficiaiy or 
cancel the policy.1 In view of these points it is wise for the client
1 See the Estate Tax Act, section 3 ( l ) ( m )  and 3 ( 5 ) (a).
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not to buy the insurance himself but to allow his wife to buy it on 
his life. The policy proceeds can be made payable to the client’s 
estate and the premiums can be paid by the client.
In providing for liquidity through life insurance it is vital that 
the wife should appoint to the husband and his estate irrevocably. 
If a revocable appointment is made the entire plan might be frus­
trated as a revocable appointment may be changed at any time. It 
is noted that the manner for making revocable or irrevocable 
appointments is set out in the new life insurance provisions. The 
most significant change wrought by the new life insurance pro­
visions which came into effect on July 1, 1962 is the abolition of 
the preferred beneficiary statutory trust. This change brought with 
it changes in the law relating to insurance designations and credi­
tors’ rights to insurance money. These should all be reviewed with 
care for estate planning purposes.
Basically there are two ways for a wife to acquire insurance 
on her husband’s life. She may apply for a policy on his life, that 
is, the initiation of new insurance and he may transfer his owner­
ship in existing policies to her.
If the wife uses her own money to pay the premiums there 
is no tax problem in the first method. A latent danger lurks in 
the second method if the transfer is by way of gift. It is common 
knowledge that gifts inter vivos made within three years of death 
are brought back into the estate for estate tax purposes.2 Couple 
this rule with the fair market value concept of the Estate Tax Act 
as set out in section 58(1) (5) and you will quickly perceive the 
danger. Thus, if a husband gives a $50,000.00 face value life 
policy to his wife which has, say, a $4,000.00 cash surrender 
value at the date of gift and the husband dies within three years 
of this gift the full $50,000.00 is brought back into the estate.3
Where the wife applies for the insurance but the husband 
pays the premiums it may be that the Department will attempt to 
tax under section 3(1) (j) of the Estate Tax Act. This section 
brings into tax “an annuity or other interest purchased or provided 
by the deceased to the extent of the beneficial interest arising on 
the death”. It has been held that the words “other interest” are 
broad enough to include insurance.4 However, the House of Lords 
has stated with respect to the same provision in the English 
Finance Act, 1894, that the policy must be separated from the
2 Estate Tax Act, s. 3(1 ) ( c ) .
3 See Papp Estate v. M.N.R., 64 DTC 5074; aff’d. 64 DTC 5289.
4 D ’Avigdor-Goldsmid v. I.R.C., [1953] 1 ALL E.R. 403.
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proceeds of the policy. The suggestion is that the interest pur­
chased or provided is the policy and on death there is simply a 
realization of the rights under the policy; nothing new arises on 
death so that section 3(1) (j) may not apply.5
In order for this reasoning to apply of course the beneficiary 
under the policy must have an absolute right to the proceeds. If 
his right is merely contingent and then made certain on death there 
is a new beneficial interest arising.
Statements have been made by the estate tax authorities that 
it is the Department’s intention to tax all life insurance under sec­
tion 3 (1 ) (m) and that if it does not fall within that section it will 
not be taxed. This statement is by no means binding and in view 
of the Papp Estate case, it is submitted that it would be advisable 
to approach section 3(1 ) ( j)  with caution. In the opinion of the 
writer, to make certain section 3 ( l ) ( j )  is avoided the wife should 
use her own funds to pay the policy premiums. The husband may 
give her these funds but even in that event it is safer to have the 
wife borrow from the bank, pay the premiums and then let the 
husband make a gift which she uses to pay the bank. This may 
seem very circuitous and unnecessary, but in this field it pays 
dividends to proceed with caution.
Where the wife pays for a policy transferred to her by her 
husband but the consideration is inadequate a gift of the difference 
between the price paid and the cash surrender value has been 
made. This gift, if the transferor dies within three years, is then 
brought back into the estate, but only at the value at the date of 
transfer.8
Thus in transferring insurance from husband to wife it is 
suggested that:
1. it not be done by way of gift;
2. the wife pay full consideration for the policy; or
3. the wife pay partial consideration for the policy provided 
the partial consideration is not so small as to take the 
transaction out of the category of a sale and make it, in 
effect, a gift.
A gift tax question arises when a wife purchases a policy on 
her husband’s life and appoints, say, her son as beneficiary. This 
is known as a third party policy. When the wife or husband pays 
the premiums is a ¿ f t  made to the son? It is thought not. The
5 See Westminster Bank Ltd. v. I.R.C., [1958] A.C. 210.
6 See Estate Tax Act, s. 3 ( 1 ) (g ) .
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basic reason for this opinion is that nothing has been assigned 
transferred or disposed of to the son by way of gift as required 
by the gift tax provisions.7 If the son is merely a revocable 
appointee, it is believed that the question is without doubt. As 
such he has nothing. All his rights as beneficiary are subject to 
divestment. If he is appointed irrevocably the position is less 
clear. In such cases the appointee is put in a valuable position. 
But even in this case no property has been given to him.
At best, from the government’s point of view, the irrevocable 
appointment of a beneficiary is comparable to the creation of an 
expectancy or spes successionis, neither of which can be classified 
as property. Section 139(1 )(ag) of the Income Tax Act defines 
property as “ . . . property of any kind whatsoever . . . and 
includes a right of any kind whatsoever and a chose in action”. 
One doubts that this definition adds much to the common law. But 
even if the government could classify the rights created by the irre­
vocable appointment of a beneficiary as property within the 
meaning found in the Income Tax Act, then it is believed that the 
problems of valuation would render it virtually impossible to levy 
gift tax. On what basis would you value the beneficiaries’ rights?
Other methods of creating liquidity are investments in liquid 
assets and cash savings. Buy-sell agreements, in addition to other 
functions they perform, are also valuable in providing liquid funds 
to an estate. TTiey have an automatic conversion feature and save 
the executors the problems of finding a buyer. Capitalization of 
surplus and the issue of redeemable preferred shares is also very 
valuable in this regard. The redemption may be funded by insur­
ance if the business is the type which has a chronic cash shortage 
or which may not be able to borrow.
4. Estate Splitting
(a) General Note
Estate tax advantages can be gained through effective life­
time estate splitting, but caution should be exercised in this area.
It is true that gifts made past the three year period and within 
the gift tax exemption clearly reduce estate tax, but before any 
man is advised to give away his property he should be told clearly 
and unmistakedly that a gift is an absolute transfer of property. 
He cannot get the property back.
For some wives a large “gift” may be her passport to inde­
pendence and flight for which she has longed for many years.
7 See the Income Tax Act, s. 111(2 ).
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Examples of frustrated estate planning are not hard to find. 
For instance in Steinberg v. Steinberg,9 a husband had transferred 
shares of stock worth $15,000.00 to his wife. He was later 
advised, to avoid gift tax, to take back promissory notes from her 
and forgive the indebtedness over a period of four years. A year 
later they parted and the husband sued on the notes. The Court 
found the notes were of no value and that the wife was not liable 
on them. It cost Mr. Steinberg $15,000.00 to save $1,600.00 in 
gift tax. The price was a little high! Obviously not all transactions 
of this nature backfire so violently. The point is that the client 
should be advised of the possible repercussions in making gifts.
(b) The Gift Tax Exemptions and Rates
Every taxpayer has a basic exemption of $4,000.00 or one- 
half the difference between his previous year’s taxable income and 
the tax paid thereon, whichever is greater. In addition, the tax­
payer may make as raany $1,000 gifts to separate individuals as 
he wishes, and there is the further exemption of $10,000 as a once- 
in-a-lifetime gift of an interest in real property. And, of course, 
you can give to your heart’s content to charity or the Government.
A gift of property to a trustee for a number of beneficiaries 
can be segregated into separate $1,000 amounts.0 In using the 
$1,000 exemption care must be taken to evaluate the property 
being given since, if the gift exceeds $1,000.00, the entire exemp­
tion is lost.10
The once-in-a-lifetime exemption of an interest in real prop­
erty must also be employed with caution. The statute allows an 
exemption for a gift of “an interest in real property”. Thus the 
sale of property to your wife in return for a promissory note or 
notes which are later forgiven will not qualify. The gift in this 
case would be of the indebtedness and not of an “interest in real 
property.”11 It is this sort of case which illustrates the need for 
lawyers to accept the recommendations and advice of non-lawyers 
in these matters with some care and scrutiny.
If the client is intent upon making gifts and if his estate is 
very large it may be advisable to make gifts beyond the exemption 
and pay gift tax. Gift tax rates are roughly only one-half of estate 
tax rates. Thus a very large gift, say in the order of $500,000 or 
$600,000, will yield high tax savings if the taxpayer lives for three
8 (1 9 6 4 ), 45 D.L.R. (2d ) 162.
9 See Baynes v. M.N.R., (1 9 5 4 ), 54 DTC 361.
10 Gouge v. M.N.R., 50 DTC 278.
11 See Manning v. M.N.R., 63 DTC 286.
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years. There is one situation known of where the taxpayer has 
now lived the three years, and will have saved estate tax of about 
$800,000 even though he paid nearly $400,000 in gift tax.
There is an advantage in paying the gift tax even if the tax­
payer does not live the three years. Under the Estate Tax Act, 
only the amount of the gift is brought back into the estate and 
thus the taxpayer’s estate is reduced by the amount of gift tax he 
paid on the gift. For example, A has an estate of $700,000. He 
makes a gift of $500,000 to B and pays $200,000 in tax. On A’s 
death within three years, only the $500,000 is brought back into 
his estate for tax, yet the total $200,000 tax will be allowed as a 
credit to the estate against the estate tax payable.
One last point to note is that gift tax rates are cumulative. 
Thus the rate of gift tax on a gift of $40,000 but not exceeding 
$50,000 is 15%. However, if the gift is between $50,000 and 
$75,000 the rate is 16%. The increase of 1% applies to the first 
$50,000 as well as the last $25,000. Thus the tax on a $50,000 
gift is $7,500. The tax on $51,000 is $8,160. Even though the 
extra gift is only $1,000 the tax has increased by $660 or exactly 
66%. The moral here is that if your gifts are going to be close 
to the start of a bracket it is better to reduce it a little to stay 
within the previous bracket.
(c) Testator’s Family Maintenance Act: Is there a hole in the 
Gift and Estate Tax Act?
The Testator’s Family Maintenance Act12 is more than pass­
ing interest in the area of estate splitting. This Statute gives the 
wife and children a right to apply to a Judge for more adequate 
provision than is made for them under the husband’s will or, if he 
died intestate, under the intestacy laws. The intention of a lifetime 
gift program may be to provide for the wife and allow the testator 
to leave the remainder of his property outright to say, his children, 
or collateral relatives or charity or other similar objects. If the 
wife and children are completely cut out of the will a danger of 
thwarting the plan will be created.
Under the Statute, a Judge considers all the circumstances, 
and written reasons from the testator explaining the lay-out of the 
will are of particular value. Thus a testator should, at the time of 
making his will, write a short memorandum explaining that lifetime 
gifts have been made to the wife and children or whatever other 
circumstances exist; that it has all been done pursuant to a plan; 
and, that the amount given is in his opinion sufficient to maintain 
his wife and children in the manner to which they are accustomed.
12 1959 Statutes, c. 14.
\
\
At estate tax time many people in common láw jurisdiction 
have looked with envy and some dismay at community property 
taxpayers in Quebec. Our eyes are often bigger than our bellies 
and generally we have more than enough before us. With the 
enactment of the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act there may be 
no further cause for envy in New Brunswick. It may be possible 
to split an estate in New Brunswick without fear of gift or 
estate tax.
Consider, if you will, the basis of the Testator’s Family 
Maintenance Act. The basic rule of the English common-law is 
absolute freedom of testamentary disposition. Another rule is that 
a husband is legally bound to maintain his wife, and now by 
statute his children. This right to maintenance is in effect extended 
beyond the life of the husband. The declared rationale erf the 
Testator’s Family Maintenance Act is to limit plenary power of 
testamentary disposition and to ensure adequate maintenance and 
support for those whom the testator is morally and legally bound 
to support.13 If the husband does not make adequate provision 
for his dependants the Court will do it for him. Under these Acts 
a woman’s right to receive is established. The amount she receives 
is not established by right but by discretion.14
If you accept the premises just stated, then it is submitted 
that a wife can release her rights under the Act for a lump sum 
or other adequate consideration from the husband without gift 
tax and if he died within three years no estate tax would be 
exigible. It has been held that the surrender of dower rights in 
return for a lump sum from the husband is not adequate considera­
tion and the transaction is taxable as a gift.18 There has been a 
decision (dealt with, infra), taxing as a gift a payment made under 
an antenuptial agreement made by parties in Quebec wherein the 
wife surrendered her property rights in her husband’s estate.
In the view of the writer, these cases would not be an answer 
to an agreement wherein a wife released her rights to present 
maintenance as well as all rights under the Testator’s Family 
Maintenance Act in return for a cash payment. A surrender of 
such rights would be adequate consideration. The transaction could 
hardly be characterized as a gift. The husband is left free to 
dispose of the remainder of his property as he sees fit and the wife 
has received handsome support.
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13 See Parish v. Parish et al., 11924] N.Z.L.R. 307.
14 See Walker v. McDermott, [1931] S.C.R. 94 for the manner o f inter­
preting these statutes.
15 See Pachal v. 62 D T C  289; Leger v. M .N.R., 63 DTC 372.
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You of course will say such a contract is void and that a wife 
cannot barter away her rights to present maintenance or future 
maintenance under the Act. It is suggested that such contracts are 
only voidable and if a wife has been adequately provided for under 
the agreement the court will not interfere with it.18 In any event 
it would not be the entire contract which is void but merely the 
clause which attempts to oust the court’s jurisdiction. You cannot, 
in other words, prevent the courts from reviewing the contract. 
Wifely support and maintenance is a matter of public concern, but 
if the pre-estimate of the wife’s needs has been judicious the Court 
will not make an order.17
Assuming, without deciding, a contract of this nature is void, 
it seems possible to construct a contract within the terms of the 
Act which would be valid. Pursuant to section 16 of the Act, a 
court will not make an order affecting property bequeathed by the 
testator pursuant to a contract to bequeath such property except 
to the extent that the value of the property, in the opinion of the 
Judge, exceeds the consideration received by the testator therefor. 
Thus if a husband and wife agreed in consideration of the wife 
releasing dower, present maintenance and all rights under the 
Testator’s Family Maintenance Act, that he would'transfer one-half 
of his property to her immediately and bequeath the other half 
to say, his children, the contract could be upheld by virtue of 
section 16.
Lastly, if these arguments fail, it should be possible to have 
such a contract ratified by private bill and thus alleviate any 
problems insofar as voidability is concerned.
Under section 3 (1 ) (a) of the Estate Tax Act the estate is 
taxed on all property over which the decedent was, immediately 
prior to his death, competent to dispose. The words “competent 
to dispose” mean uncontrolled and complete freedom of alienation 
of property. A statutory fetter on testamentary powers of disposi­
tion is created by the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act. Could 
it not be argued that by virtue of this Act the decedent is not 
competent to dispose of all his property and therefore not all of 
his property can be subjected to estate tax? If this argument was 
successful, it would create something comparable to a community 
property law in the common law provinces.
16 See Smith v. National Trust Co. Ltd. (1 9 5 8 ), 15 D.L.R. (2 d ) 520.
17 See Hyman v. Hyman, [1929] A.C. 601 per Lord Atkin, page 629; 
and Laskin, The Protection of Interests by Statute and the Problem 
of "Contracting Out" (1 9 3 8 ), 16 Can. Bar Rev. 669, at 690-691.
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Another argument supporting the non-taxability of the inter 
vivos transfer of property is based on the Estate Tax Act itself. 
Section 3 ( l ) ( q )  of the Estate Tax Act says that dower or curtesy 
shall not be deducted in computing the value of property passing 
on death. The fact that rights under the Testator’s Family Main­
tenance Act are not mentioned suggests these rights are to be taken 
into consideration for estate tax purposes. Moreover, the estate 
tax laws make it clear that marriage, dower and curtesy are not 
adequate consideration to support a transfer of property as a sale. 
Again, rights to support and maintenance under the Testator’s 
Family Maintenance Act are not mentioned. Neither of these are 
stated in the gift tax laws although, as has already been noted, the 
courts have held dower to be insufficient consideration to support 
a sale. No Canadian court has yet dealt with the question of 
whether a release of rights to maintenance and support would be 
adequate consideration for a transfer so as to bring it within the 
realm of sale rather than gift.
In Merill v. Fahs,18 it was held that a release of dower and 
other marital rights in return for a transfer in trust of $300,000 
constituted a gift. The court said the release was not adequate 
and full consideration in money or money’s worth as required by 
the statute. It is pointed out that the Internal Revenue Code, 1954, 
defines a gift as, inter alia, a transfer for less than adequate and 
full consideration in money or money’s worth. We have no similar 
provision in our gift tax law. Our courts rely on the general 
principle that if a sale is made for almost no consideration a gift 
is really intended and the transaction, insofar as the consideration 
is inadequate, is treated as a gift.
But for a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Tax 
Appeal Board has said it would not find against the taxpayer in 
the type of transaction considered here. In Houghton v. M .N.R.,10 
the taxpayer under an antenuptial marriage contract in Quebec 
agreed to transfer, in 1936, $10,000 or property erf equal value 
to his wife-to-be who in return agreed to release all her rights in 
his property. In 1951, pursuant to his agreement of 1936, the 
husband transferred property worth $23,000 to his wife. The tax 
department assessed gift tax on the entire amount. It was held 
that the release of rights by the wife under the contract was not 
for “full consideration in money or money’s worth”. The Board 
cited and relied on The Royal Trust Company et al. v. M .N.R.20
18 324 U.S. 308; 89 L. Ed. 963.
19 56 D T C  339.
20 [1949] S.C.R. 727; 49 DTC 685.
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In the latter case, an attempt was made to take a deduction for 
succession duty purposes of the amount owing under a marriage 
contract. The Succession Duty Act, like the Estate Tax Act, 
required that debts be bona fide and for full consideration in money 
or money’s worth before they are deductible.21 The Supreme Court 
held that under the civil law and by reference to articles of the 
Civil Code, the husband’s covenant to pay is not onerous but 
gratuitous in contracts of this nature. The marital rights sur­
rendered by the wife simply did not fall into the class of “full 
consideration in money or money’s worth”. Note that the Houghton 
case was a gift tax matter and the Board said at page 342:
“I may add th:>! if it were not for the judgment o f the Supreme 
Court o f  Cu-.i.da I would have accepted the appellant’s con­
tention."
It is felt that the appellant’s contention could have been 
accepted in this case notwithstanding the Supreme Court judgment. 
After all, the question for determination in the Houghton case was 
whether a gift had been made, not whether the husband had 
received full and valuable consideration in money or money’s 
worth. These two questions are not synonomous. It is this point 
which the Tax Appeal Board failed to appreciate.
It would be folly to suggest that a transfer of the nature 
under consideration here would definitely not attract gift tax. The 
arguments presented, however, do support such a conclusion. The 
tax rewards for anyone bold enough to rely on them would be 
great. The risk is not too high as estate tax will have to be paid 
if the husband has the property in his estate at his death.
(d) Use of Trusts and Transfers of Property as Affected by 
Income Tax
The trust is no new instrument to the law and lawyers. In 
estate planning, living trusts are being used with increasing fre­
quency. Following is a summary of the reasons for using trusts 
in an estate plan:
1. It enables an otherwise occupied client to obtain specialized 
property management and investment services.
2. It permits accumulations of wealth in a separate pocket not 
connected with the contingencies and hazards of business.
3. It prevents interruptions and delays at the time of death and 
facilitates the orderly transmission of property and estate 
administration.
21 See the Estate Tax Act, s. 5 ( 1 ) (a).
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4. It may be a convenient vehicle to provide for the client’s 
wife and parents and other persons in whom he is interested 
without making direct demands on his business income or 
assets.
5. A living trust enables a man to familiarize himself with a 
trust and its operation and allows the client himself to judge 
the instrument.
6. Tax saving. A trust can be most useful for the purpose of 
income splitting.22
Transfers of property may be made directly to the transferee or 
may be made directly to a trustee for the use and benefit of some 
person.
In making transfers of property one should be aware of 
sections 21(1) and 22 of the Income Tax Act. These provisions 
say that income from property transferred by one spouse to the 
other, or to a child (not necessarily of the transferor) under 19, 
remains taxable to the transferor. Sections 21(1) and 22(1) 
require that the property be “transferred to” the spouse or child. 
Thus it seems that a gift or transfer of property to a corporation 
controlled by the spouse or child would not fall within these provi­
sions. Nothing has been “transferred to” the individuals, although 
there has been an accrual in value of their shares. Sections 21(1) 
and 22(1) refer to transfers, either “directly or indirectly”. Similar 
words in English tax legislation have been interpreted narrowly.
In Potts’ Executors v. I.R .C .** the House of Lords held, in 
connection with a provision of the English Income Tax Act, that 
a payment by a trustee to the creditor of A at the direction of A 
was not a payment to A either directly or indirectly. The English 
provision being interpreted in this case resembles the wording of 
section 21(1) so that the decision could easily be applied in 
Canada.
Lord Simonds made an interesting comment on the words 
“directly” and “indirectly” when he stated at p. 80:
“I do not think it matters whether the words ‘directly or 
indirectly’ qualify the payment or the receipt. I will assume they 
qualify both or either.”
and he went on to say at p. 81:
“So far, my Lords, I have not specifically dealt with the word 
‘indirectly.’ It is sufficient to say that it cannot so enlarge the
22 For a more complete summary o f  the uses o f trusts see Upper Canada 
Law Society Lectures 1957, Estate Planning, pp. 32-34.
23 [1951] 1 ALL E.R. 76.
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meaning o f the words ‘paid to the settlor’ . . .  for his own use 
and benefit. I do not feel called upon to determine positively 
what transactions it might be apt to cover. It may be that it is 
not apt to cover any that are not already covered by the normal 
meaning o f the words ‘paid to the settlor’.”
Another point in connection with these sections is that it is 
only the income from the property transferred which is taxed. 
Thus, if the property is used in a business and there is income from 
the business the section does not apply. For example, if A gives 
to his wife shares of stock which she trades and makes a profit, 
this profit, if not classified as capital gain, will be taxable to the 
wife and not the husband.24
Section 22(2) of the Income Tax Act allows a transfer of 
property in trust and provides that the income from the property 
will not be taxable to the transferor provided (1) no reversion 
has been retained, (2) the settlor has not retained the right to 
change beneficiaries, and (3) the settlor has not prohibited dis­
position of the property except with his consent or direction.
This provision, together with sections 21(1) and 22(1), is 
designed to prevent advantageous income splitting. Obviously, in 
a progressive rate system, $20,000 will bear less tax if split in two 
and taxed twice at the $10,000 rate. To avoid the application erf 
sections 22(1) or 22(2), it has been suggested that if the minor’s 
right to income is made conditional on his attaining 19, then the 
trust will bear the tax. Notice that the trust must clearly state that 
the minor has no right to either income or capital unless and until 
he reaches 19. The trustee should be prohibited from advancing 
any income to any beneficiary under 19.25
There are two points of interest to note about these sections 
from an estate splitting point of view. Even though the Income 
Tax Act treats the income from the property as that of the trans­
feror, in law the income belongs to the transferee. Thus there is 
a built-in extra gift tax exemption. The income from the property 
transferred goes into the transferee’s estate without gift or estate 
tax. You see, the government is being generous even when it is 
getting its pound of flesh. Moreover, because the transferor pays 
the tax there is a further reduction in his estate. No estate tax will 
be paid on this amount. There is a point where the estate and 
gift tax saved is more than the income tax paid. At this point I 
think it fair to say the government has been “too clever by half’.
24 See M.N.R. v. Robins, 63 DTC 1012.
25 See Scott-Hartson, J.C., “The Lawyer In Estate Planning” (1 9 6 2 ),
10 Can. Tax Journal 116, at 119.
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In those situations where the income from the property is in the 
form of dividends, the taxpayer is entitled to the 20% dividend 
tax credit.20 One begins to wonder if there is not some slight 
conflict between present income, gift and estate tax laws.
(e) Personal Corporations
For a very long time now personal corporations have been 
effective tools in estate planning. What is a personal corporation? 
It is no different than any other ordinary corporation created under 
provincial or Federal law. The term “personal corporation” is 
a creation of income tax. Pursuant to section 68, where a corpora­
tion is family controlled, more than 25% of its income is from 
investments, and it does not carry on an active commercial or 
financial business, it is a personal corporation.
The consequence of being a personal corporation is simply 
that the income of the corporation is taxed directly to the share­
holders. Personal corporations are used in estate planning to 
avoid multiple succession duties and probate in many jurisdictions. 
They have been used for estate freezing and income splitting. Less 
known, but equally valuable, is their use in estate splitting.
An interesting case on the interrelation of a trust, a personal 
corporation and section 21(1) was decided by the Exchequer 
Court in May of 1964. In Pichosky v. M .N.R ,27 a husband trans­
ferred $1,600 to the Albert Pichosky Trust to pay the income to 
his wife for life and on her death to his three sons at age thirty. 
The trust then bought shares in Albert Pichosky Limited which 
owned shares of Stork Company Limited. Albert Pichosky Limited 
was a personal corporation. In 1959 Stork paid a dividend of 
$60,000 to Albert Pichosky Limited. The Minister assessed the 
husband for tax on the $60,000 under section 21(1) alleging this 
was income from the shares of Albert Pichosky Limited which had 
been purchased with the original $1,600 put in the trust.
President Jackett allowed the taxpayer’s appeal. He held that 
section 21(1) applies only to make “income that otherwise would 
be taxable in the hands of the transferee being taxable in the hands 
of the transferor”. In this case, even though section 67 deems the 
income of the personal corporation to have been received by the 
shareholder—the trust— there was in fact no income paid to the 
trust. Thus, there was no income payable to the beneficiary under 
the trust provisions of section 63(6) (7 ). In this instance the 
$60,000 would not have been otherwise taxable in the hands of 
Mrs. Pichosky.
26 Income Tax Act, s. 3 8 (3 ) .
27 64 D T C  5105.
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The trick in this case is that the personal corporation paid 
no dividend so that there was no income in the trust taxable to 
Mrs. Pichosky. It is important to note that even though the 
Income Tax Act deems personal corporation income to be distri­
buted this is only for the purposes of taxing that income. The 
manner for declaring and paying out dividends remains a matter 
of corporate law under the jurisdiction where the company is 
incorporated.
Criticism has been levelled at the Pichosky case. Gwyneth 
McGregor, writing in the Canadian Tax Journal28 makes out a 
fairly convincing case for non-reliance on the decision of the 
Exchequer Court. The writer, however, likes the Exchequer Court 
judgment, and would be quick to use the interesting possibilities 
suggested by it.
5. Estate Freezing
The object of estate freezing is to avoid estate tax. It is not 
total avoidance but rather the avoidance of any further tax after 
a given date. For instance, you may review a client’s estate and 
find it to be worth $300,000. The estate tax on such an estate 
may be quite substantial. It is therefore prudent to prevent any 
future growth in value of those assets from accumulating in the 
client’s hands.
One popular method of accomplishing this result was to 
incorporate a personal corporation to which the father would 
transfer his growth assets in return for redeemable voting preferred 
shares. His children, or others that he wanted to benefit, would 
take back the common. Any growth would accrue to the common 
shares but yet, through the use of voting preferred shares, the 
father continued to control the direction and management of the 
assets.
Since the enactment of section 138A— dealing with dividend 
stripping—the Department says this device, where the asset trans­
ferred to the corporation is shares of stock, will be attacked. The 
attack will only come in those cases where the newly incorporated 
company is depersonalized so that earnings of the subsidiary 
corporation after the date control is acquired will pass tax free. 
There are many ways to depersonalize a corporation. One of the 
most popular methods is to give the corporation an “active busi­
ness”. Thus there are a great many hot dog stands and cigar stores
28 Vol. XII, No. 4, pp. 239-241.
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around the country being operated by large corporations. Notwith­
standing this fact, very careful consideration should be given to 
this device before relying on it.
It is not believed that the Department can press section 138A 
with any degree of success in these circumstances. To be on the 
safe side, however, it has been suggested that the best thing to do 
is make the second corporation a personal corporation. Estate 
freezing is still accomplished but income tax benefits are materially 
reduced.29 Since it is the income tax benefit with which the 
Department is concerned it is not apt to take up the cudgels.
It is possible to do estate freezing without the use of a second 
corporation. In its place a business trust may be established with 
the use of redeemable preferred trust certificates and common trust 
certificates. The rights attaching to each of these can be made 
similar to what you would use for stock certificates. The same 
control over the assets can be obtained by allowing the father to 
vote the corporate stock held by the trust. Such a trust would 
of course be taxable on income in the manner usually applicable 
to trusts. This device is purely and simply a common law corpora­
tion. In the view of the writer we have not even begun to examine 
the possibilities of such corporations in the tax field. In the United 
States, this legal tool has been in use for some time.
Other means of accomplishing an estate freeze are a simple 
sale of the growth asset to the individual you desire to ultimately 
receive the increased value of your estate. These particular methods 
come to mind but undoubtedly others of much more ingenuity 
and mental wonderment could be conjured up.
6. Buy and Sell Agreements
Perverse tax consequences may arise on the death of one 
party to a buy-sell arrangement. For example, A and B each own 
50% of the stock in XYZ Company. Under a buy-sell agreement 
each agrees to sell to the survivor his shares at say $50,000. On 
the death of A the shares are worth $75,000. A’s estate must 
include $75,000 in gross value but B is only obligated to pay 
$50,000 for the stock. However, B will, unless he is a beneficiary 
under A’s will, have to pay the estate tax on $25,000. All of this 
arises by virtue of sections 3 (1 ) (i) , 14, 4(3) and 4(1) of the 
Estate Tax Act.
29 See 1964 Law Society o f Upper Canada Lectures on Taxation, H. R  
Stikeman, p. 15.
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To avoid these difficulties it is wise to ensure that a buy-sell 
agreement contains some flexibility in the valuation clause. More­
over, if it is desired to fix a valuation and the possible purchaser 
is also a beneficiary under the seller’s will, a clause should be 
inserted in the will making the successor liable for the additional 
estate tax on the excess valuation for tax purposes over that fixed 
in the agreement. It may be that the client wants to benefit the 
purchaser free and clear of any taxes; this, of course, will be a 
matter to be ascertained. It is merely pointed out that there are 
problems which should be considered in reaching a conclusion.
7. Conclusion
This paper has only touched briefly and in a general way on 
a number of points of interest in estate planning. There remains 
this last comment:
Lawyers have allowed much of the tax and estate planning 
field to pass by default to other group«. In this the lawyers have 
done a grave disservice to the profession generally and the public 
particularly. There is nothing more mysterious about this area of 
law than creditors’ rights or domestic relations. True, it has 
attained a certain liturgy which is known only to the high priests 
of specialization; but the mumbo-jumbo of tax law can be easily 
mastered, through study and application, just as any other subject. 
Let me conclude by quoting Mr. J. T. Gow, Q.C., in his Upper 
Canada Law Society Lectures on Taxation 1964:*°
“Estate planning should be the prerogative o f the solicitor. Of 
all those engaged in the work he has nothing to sell but his 
services. He alone is competent to consider all the branches of  
work involved and give disinterested advice. There is no doubt 
that estate planning is a growing field and if the legal profession 
does its duty, there is probably no field o f legal activity more 
likely to develop in the years ahead.”
30 At page 456.
